You ought to endeavor to glide. Maintain the shoulder area r

[anima]

Voila, le truc est simple: j'ai du écrire une dissert' d'entre 1000 et 2000 mots pour la candidature a l'université d'Oxford. Quelqu'un pourrait me donner un avis franc dessus? (c'est écrit en anglais)

Sébastien RENAULD, FS7
Philosophy Essay

Topic: Can a scientific theory be false?

For centuries, almost everyone used their common sense, and past dealings with similar problems, to form new pseudo-theories. However, is there a way to draw a line between what can be considered scientific, and what isn’t?
Before a lengthy argument, it should be said that the examples in this essay will not only consider what the lesser public qualifies as “pure sciences” – merely physics, maths – but also subjects like geography, history or others, simply because the criteria to validate a theory are the same in all those fields. Theories will also be defined as a law, to describe the events occurring in the world.
The only thing left to define is: what are those criteria? How can we base a theory on other theories? And most importantly, is induction sufficient?

Theories are mostly born out of two different and distinct “methods”. A theory can be deducted from series of experiments (such as Kepler’s laws of gravitation physics), which would then be classified as induction, or from other theories, which would then be deduction. In both cases, a “theory tree” is very quickly formed, with global theories as its roots, and deductions as its branches. However, are there any limits to this?
When a theory is deducted from previous experiments, the biggest danger towards its creation is the falsification (or, what is known in French as “truandage”, a very familiar way to describe how some scientists fake their results to fit with their theory, such as the Coulomb law of electromagnetic attraction, where half of the results were removed because they did not fit with the thoughts of the scientist…) of results. The very first step towards establishment as a general theory is the possibility to re-do the experiments, and find the same properties. There is no place for luck; there is no place for non-scientific experiments. Everything has to be double-checked. And if there is an error, it might not be that the theory is wrong; the biggest problem with induction is that it is linked to the quality of the equipment, in this particular case.
Such a theory, when it can be double-checked, is then true; or at least, true at this given time. It is verifiable, and describes directly what happens in the experiment. And it will remain true, until it can be falsified (because, alas, as outlined by D. Hume, induction’s biggest flaw is that it goes from one example to a generalisation – and no one knows that every single thing affected by this theory will react in the same way). And if it can be falsified one day, then a scientific revolution will occur – this is why it is only viable and valid right now, and can be generalised and adapted to its given context.

Now, let us explore the deep recesses of deduction, mankind’s biggest Damocles’ Sword - Such a bad thing, because it can either be a real benefactor, or an insanely high error cause, if it isn’t used properly. And, just like induction, it has its problems.
Deduction can be two things: anticipation, backed up later on by experiments, or a “theory graft” onto another theory, to make it a bit more precise. The first aspect of it can be considered rightfully used, however, the second one might seem to be incomplete; there is no link to reality. I will explain this one first.
Theory grafts can be a gamble; once again, it really has two uses. If backed up properly, they pose no threat. However, when the reality is expected to yield the results given by the theory, and not the other way around, then it is more of a malevolent nature. Such a paradox can be seen when analogies are made in science; my examples on this will be Coulomb and his law of electromagnetic attraction, and Kepler’s law of gravitation. On one side, Charles de Coulomb used a very bad kind of analogy to find his theory: he merely committed plagiarism by copying gravitation, and then falsified his experimental results to “prove” his theory. Such a gamble was dangerous, but eventually he had the right theory after all (imagine if he didn’t…). Kepler’s laws of gravitation (Three laws) were proved mathematically – however, nothing proved that it worked, and since no telescope was there, it was not possible to either verify or falsify it. Eventually, 4 planets were discovered with his laws, but again, it is a bad example to follow. Such grafts could have endangered the whole theory they were grafted to (in both examples, Newton’s theory of gravitation). And in the same category should reside the example given by Claude Lévi-Strauss (Exact quotation in the epilogue) about palaeontology, or rather how some “scientists” mislabelled artefacts because they had an opinion on the subject – a false opinion, that is. Such a theory was then falsified.
However, deduction theories, if backed up by induction later on, can be a salvation; how many theories were thought, and then proved correct by experiments? Such theories had, at the start, no intention to become what they became; they were just anticipations of what might happen. And such “hunches” were then verified by experiments, making them proper, verified theories, while still being capable of being falsified. The best example (again in Physics) is the birth of quantum theories. Max Planck (amongst others) anticipated what could happen at sub-atomic levels, and built a whole spectrum to the positioning of charged particles inside the atom – which is still actively studied, but is thought to be correct. This theory is then, until further notice, true. Theories in the same range of subject (sub-atomic physics, or anything that cannot be seen properly), such as the discovery of the positron, are often anticipation.

Under such circumstances, such verified scientific theories might seem extemporal. In reality, though, there is a need for theories to be renewed, and made obsolete by new, better theories. Such a thing happened to Newton’s laws of mechanical physics. His three laws (why are all laws in groups of 3?), the continuum in movement if the sum of forces is void, the expression of acceleration, and the preservation of movement, worked quite well in the normal spectrum of physics – they are used in classrooms every day. However, when the velocity of objects gets near the speed of light, such a theory becomes obsolete, because of relativistic theories, which are far more precise in this range of velocities. Einstein’s relativity theory successfully completed Newton’s movement theory – a perfect theory graft.
Such theories also depend, as seen in the example, on the context. Different speeds, different theories; so, no real theory can be used to describe the whole spectrum of phenomena experienced in different contexts. Worse, there are multiple theories, all of them equally valid, to explain some phenomena. Take Planck’s theory on light: a wave-particle duality, which can be considered as either a wave or a particle, whichever fits best.
In a philosophical approach, this could be a true problem: theories could be proved right or wrong in specific areas, or space-time location; and the further we go down this road, the more it seems that anyone could vouch up for a theory made on an ideology, especially in the fields of sociology. Human actions aren’t of a simple nature, and understanding them without adding your own beliefs to this is virtually impossible. This is why, in many cases, different theories have radical views on some facts: it is how the French Revolution does not have one starting date, but two. Historians either take the 1789 “Cahier des Doléances” political revolution, or when blood became a common phenomenon, in 1792 (“La Terreur”, as we call it; the terror, because our national executioner had problems coping with the amount of people being executed for random crimes, without justice, equality or freedom). And, of course, two theories, two views. Some historians firmly believe that the French revolution was a peaceful revolt, or a bloody mass-murder. And, in those two opinions, everything eventually boils down to ideology and pre-made opinion. The Terror might be used by Burke to prove that revolutions are bloody and useless, whereas the Doléance period was used by Proudhon to prove that Men didn’t need a Master (“Ni Dieu ni Maitre”). More recently, the ideology of science was put in question by creationists. For scientists, the valid evolution theory is Darwin’s theory, “survival of the fittest”. However, in the eyes of some religious persons, this…theory…is completely and utterly false, and man comes directly from Adam and Eve. Such an authority argument is followed by a mob of believers, and even replaced the “real” biological science in American schools!

Such matters cannot truly be an outright denial or agreement – to prove that a theory was false, we have to know without any opinion on the subject, where a problem could arise: be it because the theory is made to validate an ideology (such as the theory of the Aryan race), or because “someone” made a mistake. In any case, the question shouldn’t be whether a theory is entirely false; it would rather have to be whether a theory doesn’t exactly fit the reality. And the reality is all that matters.

Epilogue

• Lévi-Strauss’ example on palaeontology figures in his book, Race et Histoire, precisely in chapter 8, named “Hasard et Civilisation”, where palaeontologists are said to have thought that fire was discovered by accident, like other technologies, to save some ink and thought.
• Francois Proudhon: French anarchist, in the good sense of it. He denied all need for a master to govern mankind, and all need for a religion to take care of our problems.